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a b s t r a c t
We consider the problem of routing a number of communication requests in WDM
(wavelength division multiplexing) all-optical networks from the standpoint of game
theory. If we view each routing request (pair of source-target nodes) as a player, then a
strategy consists of a path from the source to the target and a frequency (color). To reflect
the restriction that two requests must not use the same frequency on the same edge,
conflicting strategies are assigned a prohibitively high cost.
Under this formulation, we consider several natural cost functions, each one reflecting
a different aspect of restriction in the available bandwidth. For each cost function
we examine the problem of the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the complexity of
recognizing and computing them and finally, the problem in which we are given a Nash
equilibrium and we are asked to find a better one in the sense that the total bandwidth
used is less. As it turns out some of these problems are tractable and others are NP-hard.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Optical networks use as physical means for transferring data lightwaves which are transmitted through optical fibers.
As current technology may handle lightwaves with bandwidth several orders of magnitude higher than electrical signals,
optical networksmay reach a peer-to-peer transfer rate far greater than any electrical network. In standard optical networks
however, data have to be converted from the optical to electrical form when passing through an intermediate switch and
converted back to optical form for retransmission to the next station. This conversion costs in time and reduces the transfer
rate to tens of GHz. In all-optical networks however, the signal retains its optical form from the transmitting to the receiving
end, thus achieving transfer rate of the order of tens of THz.
To better exploit the high bandwidth of all-optical networks, all-optical network protocols are based on wavelength-
division multiplexing, WDM, which in a sense divides the available high bandwidth in several channels. Each channel uses
a different frequency (wavelength) thus allowing the simultaneous connection of several source-destination pairs through
the same fiber, provided that they use different frequencies.
The efficient allocation of frequencies given a set of requests from pairs of hosts wishing to communicate, poses several
interesting theoretical problems. It is common in this setting to view the network as a connected graph with its nodes being
hosts or switches and its edges being the optical fibers that provide the actual communication. The available frequencies
(i.e. different channels) of an edge are represented as different colors and by the above each edge has a palette of different
colors from which a pair of communicating hosts may choose. Notice that, since we do not allow wavelength conversion, a
path has to use the same color for all its edges and of course if two paths use the same edge, they must use different colors.
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The main problem therefore, is the so called Routing and Path Coloring problem in which we are given a set of pairs
of hosts (nodes in the graph) wishing to communicate and we are asked to provide for each pair a path and a color in such
a way that no two pairs whose paths share an edge are colored the same and in addition the total number of colors used is
minimized.
This problem has been shown to be NP-hard even for rings [10] but can be solved in polynomial time for chains [22]
and bounded degree trees [19]. A natural way to tackle its hardness is to look for approximation algorithms and there are
many known results for a variety of different topologies such as trees, rings and meshes. For example, a 2-approximation
algorithm for rings is presented in [26] and a randomized algorithm with ratio better than 2 is known from [16].
Another natural problem isMaximum Routing and Path Coloring (MaxRPC): Given a graph G, a set of requests R (pairs
of nodes) and a number of colorswwe try to find an assignment of paths to a subset of requests A ⊆ R and a coloring of these
paths with different colors for overlapping paths, such that |A| is maximal. The above problem is NP-hard even for rings (via
a straightforward reduction from Routing and Path Coloring). Efficient approximation algorithms for various topologies
are given in [21,2]. Other related work includesmulti-fiber models [20,17], models that use wavelength conversion [27] and
also on-line algorithms for the same problems [2,3].
Another approach that has been recently followed to study network problems is the game-theoretic one. Several
researchers have studied the behavior of networks in general, focusing especially in congestion problems using the powerful
tools of game theory.We brieflymention here the results in [12,23,13,29], where network congestion and routing games are
studied under different game-theoretic settings. The main issue there is the study of the existence of pure Nash equilibria
and the complexity of computing them. Moreover, in [13] the social cost of Nash equilibria is also examined. In Ref. [12], the
problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for general congestion games, symmetric congestion games and asymmetric
network congestion games is shown to be PLS-complete and a P-time algorithm is presented for symmetric network
congestion games. Moreover, the results of that paper are derived using local search techniques, so the question of whether
such methods may be applied to different game settings, reasonably arises. A model very close to ours with utility function
identical to our cost function 3 (see Section 5) is studied in [6] regarding the price of stability and the price of anarchy under
several topological properties of the network. A general result regarding matroid and weighted matroid congestion games
with non-decreasing delay functions is presented in [1], where these games are shown to possess a Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, we study all-optical WDM routing under a game theoretic approach. In our setting, we view each pair of
communicating nodes as a player in a non-cooperative game. The player’s strategies are the different path-color pairs from
which he may choose, first to route his communication (the path) and second, to assign a wavelength to it (the color).
Naturally, a game setup requires some cost functionwhich represents the cost of a player in a state where each player has
chosen some specific strategy. A state in which a player feels comfortable with his strategy, i.e. his cost does not decrease if
he decides to follow another strategy, is called an equilibrium. J.F. Nash, in his classical paper [18], showed that every game
has a mixed equilibrium but not necessarily a pure one. An important question therefore in a game setting is whether it has
a pure equilibrium.
Here we consider several different natural cost functions in WDM all-optical networks and study for each one of them
the following questions:
(1) Are there any pure Nash equilibria?
(2) Can we decide in P-time if a strategy profile is an equilibrium?
(3) Can we compute an equilibrium in P-time?
(4) If we consider a computed equilibrium as a local optimum, can we find a solution (equilibrium) of better value?
The game theoretic approach in all optical networks has been studied in [5] focusing in problems 1 and 3 above and with
cost functions similar to two of the cost functions studied here. Another extension is examined in [4] where also the level of
knowledge of the network that the agents possess is taken under consideration. Different levels of knowledge are examined
varying from total knowledge of other agents strategies to partial and local knowledge only.
Notice that we do not yet have a general efficient algorithm for finding Nash equilibria (and, a fortiori, pure Nash
equilibria). This has become a famous open problem in computational complexity theory. The reader may see Refs. [9,7,
12,24,25] for recent results on this issue.
Giving efficient algorithms for the above questions means that in an all-optical network under some specific routing
conditions, a communicating pair has efficient algorithms to decide if it is better off defecting from the current solution, or if
better global solutions exist. Likewise, negative answers to the above problems mean that no practical algorithms for these
questions exist.
Moreover (inspired by a flaw in a previous version of this work [15]), we give an algorithm for computing a pure Nash
equilibrium in a related problem in which each node wants to broadcast a message in a WDM network.
Our results show that under different cost functions the complexity of recognizing a Nash equilibrium varies from NP-
complete to polynomial time. Actually, wewere led in redefining the cost function, in an attempt to lower the computational
complexity of answering some of the above questions. The new cost functions are also natural and lead to re-posing some
of the much studied optimization problems in WDM all-optical networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we give some preliminaries and formally define the
setting of the problems. In the next 4 sections we study the above questions for four different cost functions. In Section 7
we examine the broadcast problem and finally, in Section 8 we summarize our results and state some open problems.
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2. Preliminaries
A network is, for our purposes, a graph G = (V , E). A routing request is simply a pair of nodes (s, t) with s, t ∈ V . We
are given a set of M routing requests (si, ti), i = 1, . . . ,M . We are also given colors which we represent as integers in the
interval C = [1..c], where c is the maximum number of available colors. A solution to the requests is a set of M paths of G,
pi, i = 1, . . . ,M and a set ofM colors χi, i = 1, . . . ,M with path pi having as endpoints the nodes si and ti. If pi ∩ pj 6= ∅ for
i 6= j then χi 6= χj. This last requirement models the already stated assumption that if any two requests are routed through
edge-intersecting paths, then they must use different wavelengths (colors).
A game with n ≥ 2 players is defined by a finite set of strategies Si, i = 1, . . . , n and n payoff functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n
one for each player,mapping S1×· · ·×Sn to the integers. The elements of S1×· · ·×Sn are called states. A state s = (s1, . . . , sn)
is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for every i, ui(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) ≥ ui(s1, . . . , s′i, . . . , sn) for any s′i ∈ Si. A game may not
have pure Nash equilibria, but Nash in [18] proved that there always exist mixed Nash equilibria (we consider as strategy
any possible distribution on Si). We now view an all optical network GwithM requests as a (non-cooperative) game in the
following way.
• Players: TheM requests (si, ti), i = 1, . . . ,M .
• Strategies: Pairs σi = (pi, χi)where pi is a path from si to ti and χi is a color (wavelength). We represent colors as integers
in the interval [1..c].
• Cost: For each player i = 1, . . . ,M a cost function gi(σ1, . . . , σM).
In this paper we study the above questions under different cost functions. In all cost functions we are considering,
conflicting strategies are assigned a prohibitively high cost. Moreover, in all cases it is implicit that bandwidth is the main
resource that needs to be carefully managed. This is reflected in the number of colors used (this is actually our first cost
function that charges a path according to the number of conflicts with other colors), the color number used on a path (note
that this is a different measure than the previous one and is equivalent to charging a path according to the frequency it uses,
the higher the frequency the greater the cost), the most saturated link (in terms of the different paths that use it) and the
highest color number (chromatic level) on a link (this charges links not paths, that use high frequency).
3. Cost function 1: Number of different colors
The first cost function we consider is the number of different colors that are used along a player’s path. That is, for all
players their corresponding cost function is
gi((p1, x1), . . . , (pM , xM)) =

∞ if there is a conflict∣∣∣∣∣⋃e∈pi X(e)
∣∣∣∣∣ otherwise (1)
where X(e) is the set of colors that are used for edge e. In other words, |X(e)| is the number of different paths that use e.
Under this cost function a player’s possible defect is toward the direction where he has fewer conflicts with different colors.
Having defined the cost function, we first attack the problem of recognizing whether a given strategy profile, under
this cost function, is a pure Nash equilibrium. (Actually, the precise statement of the problem asks the negation of that,
i.e. whether a specific state is not a Nash equilibrium.) We call this problem Nash Recognition:
Nash Recognition
• Instance. A graph G, M players (si, ti) and their strategies consisting of paths si − ti, i = 1, . . . ,M and colors χi, i =
1, . . . ,M in C = {1, . . . ,M}, such that there are no conflicts.
• Question. Is there an i such that nodes si and ti can be connected via a different path and/or a different color, with less
cost under cost function g?
For cost function 1 it turns out that even recognizing a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Theorem 1. Nash Recognition under cost function 1 is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is obviously in NP because given a path we can check in P-time the number of different colors that arise
on it. To prove completeness we will use the known NP-complete problem 1-in-3-3SATwithout negation [14]:
1-in-3-3SAT-WN
• Instance: A boolean formula with 3 positive literals per clause:
C =
∧
i=1,...,m
Ci =
∧
i=1,...,m
(ui1, ui2, ui3). (2)
• Question: Is there a satisfying truth assignment such that exactly one literal per clause is true?
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Fig. 1. The construction for the expression (z1, z2, z3)
∧
(z4, z5, z3).
Let C =∧i=1,...,m Ci =∧i=1,...,m(ui1, ui2, ui3) be an instance of 1-in-3-3SAT-WNwithm clauses.We construct an instance
of problem Nash Recognition in the following way.
(1) For every variable in C we introducem new colors.
(2) We introducem+ 2 new ‘‘universal’’ colors.
(3) For every clause Ci we construct a graph component as follows.
• We introduce 2 nodes xi, yi which we connect with 3 disjoint chain paths withµi1, µi2, µi3 edges respectively, where
µij, j = 1, 2, 3 is the total number of occurrences of variable uij in C .
• For every edge (x, y) introduced by the 3 chain paths, we consider 2 more nodes a, b, 2 edges (a, x) and (y, b) and a
player starting at a and terminating at b.
• For every (a, b)-player the instance includes the path (a, x, y, b) as part of the strategy.
• Every (a, b)-player in a (xi, yi) chain gets a different color from the set ofm colors of the respective variable.
(4) Every graph component connects to the next through an edge (yi, xi+1).
(5) For chains that belong to the same variable we choose the same color for the corresponding (a, b)-players.
(6) We introduce a new chain with m + 1 edges starting at node x1 and terminating at ym. For this chain we introduce
m+ 1(a, b)-players exactly like we did in the component chains. These players usem+ 1 of them+ 2 universal colors.
The last universal color is used by a player (x1, ym)who follows the chain and his cost is obviouslym+ 2.
An example of the described construction is shown in Fig. 1.
We observe that in the constructed instance every player has cost 1, except (x1, ym) who has cost m+ 2 and the (a, b)-
players in the ‘‘long’’ chain who have cost equal to 2. Also, every (a, b)-player has obviously no better strategy, so we turn
our attention to the (x1, ym) player.
If there is a satisfying truth assignment for C, then considering player (x1, ym) (the only possible defect) we have that, in
order to find a better strategy (with cost at mostm+1) wemust deal with the (x1, ym) paths that use the clause-component
chains. Consider the (x1, ym) path p that in every component uses the chain of the only satisfied literal. The cost of p is
1+∑ occ(u) = m+ 1, where the sum is over all variables u of the 1-in-3-3SAT-WN instance that have been assigned true
in the satisfying assignment and occ(u) is the number of occurrences of variable u in the formula. So, there is a player who
can change his strategy to a better cost. For the other direction consider a situation where there is a player that can defect.
Obviously this player is (x1, ym) (with better cost equal tom+ 1). We construct a satisfying assignment for C by setting, in
each clause, to true the variable with the chain component that is used by player (x1, ym). Then we have the following:
• Only one literal in each clause is set true.
• The assignment is consistent. Every variable we set to true charges the path with as many colors as the number of its
occurrences. So, an inconsistent assignment results in a cost greater than m + 1. This case is absurd since we assumed
that the player can improve his strategy resulting to cost equal tom+ 1.
• The path passes through all the components, so the assignment satisfies every clause in C .
This shows that there exists an appropriate satisfying truth assignment, thus completing the proof. 
Despite the high complexity of recognizing an equilibrium (or, in other words, a possible defect), we can always be sure
that an equilibrium exists. In fact, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is assured by a polynomial potential function as it is
shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. Pure Nash equilibria according to Cost Function 1 always exist.
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Proof. We consider a feasible solution (initial feasible coloring) that uses a different color for each player. That is, if there
are M players, then player i uses color i, i = 1, . . . ,M . Such a solution always exists since the network is connected and
there are no color conflicts. We then examine every player’s strategies in order to detect and apply possible defects. During
this process players who defect never change their color. Since we start from an initial solution with a different color for
each player and players never change colors, it is assured that a color conflict will never arise.
The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is proved by the following potential function:
Φ(S) =
∑
i=1,...,M
c(pi),
where S is a feasible solution ((p1, 1), . . . , (pM ,M)) and c(pi) is the cost of player i, that is the number of different colors
(or players) on his current path.
If nobody can defect we are at an equilibrium point. If there is a player i, using path pi, of cost k that defects to cost
k′ < k (path p′i), then we have the following. The cost of player i obviously decreases. Moreover, initially k− 1 players’ costs
decrease since they no longer conflict with player i on path pi and afterwards k′ − 1 players (possibly some of these players
are the same) increase their cost due to conflicts on p′i . So, since k′ − 1 < k− 1, a defect leads to a smallerΦ(S), thus at the
end we must reach an equilibrium. 
The next problemwe deal with is whether, given an equilibrium there is a better one. The metric we use to compare two
Nash equilibria is themaximum color number they use or, equivalently, the number of different colors used: an equilibrium
is better than another if it uses less colors. Notice that this problem is closely related to Routing and Path Coloring,
mentioned in the introduction but here part of the problem instance is a strategy that is a Nash equilibrium. However this
additional fact does not lower the problem complexity:
Better Nash.
• Instance. Graph G, k players (si, ti) and a Nash equilibrium usingm colors under a cost function g .
• Question. Is there a Nash equilibrium under cost function g using less thanm colors?
Proposition 1. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 1 (Number of Different Colors) is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is obviously in NP because we can count in polynomial time the total number of different colors used,
by examining all edges one by one and recording the different colors we meet. In order to prove completeness we use the
NP-complete problem k-Disjoint Paths [11].
k-Disjoint Paths
• Instance. Graph G, k pairs of nodes (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , k.
• Question. Is there a set of k edge disjoint paths between the nodes (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , k?
Given an instance of k-Disjoint Paths, G, (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , k, we construct the following instance of Better Nash (G′,
(s′i, t
′
i ), i = 1, . . . , 2k): (See Fig. 2)
• In order to construct G′ we add in G for each (si, ti), the vertices ai, bi, Ti and the edges (si, ai), (ai, Ti), (Ti, ti), (ti, bi) and
(bi, si).
• The players are (si, Ti) and (ai, bi)with i = 1, . . . , k.
• The equilibrium point that completes the construction uses paths (si, ai, Ti)with color 1 for the (si, Ti) players and paths
(ai, Ti, ti, bi)with color 2 for the (ai, bi) players. Notice that these strategies are indeed an equilibrium.
If there is a set of k disjoint (si, ti) paths in G then there is an equilibrium point in which every player uses color 1. At this
point players (si, Ti) use this set of edge disjoint paths along with edges (ti, Ti) and players (ai, bi) use the paths (ai, si, bi).
Conversely, if there is a better Nash equilibrium then it uses only one color. So, every (si, Ti) player uses only edges of G
and edges (ti, Ti), because otherwise there is a conflict with (ai, bi) players and the number of colors needed is more than
one. Since players (si, Ti)must use the same color on graph G, the (si, ti) sub-paths that they use are edge disjoint. 
4. Cost function 2: Color number
In order to relax the constraints of the first function we turn our attention to the following definition of the cost:
gi((p1, χ1), . . . , (pM , χM)) =
{∞ if there is a conflict
χi otherwise
(3)
Intuitively, under this cost function a player’s possible defect is toward the direction of lower numbered colors i.e. lower
wavelengths.
Under cost function 2 things are computationally easier. Pure Nash equilibria always exist and can be recognized and
computed in P-time using the following greedy, online algorithm.We point that Theorem 1 in Ref. [5] also states that a pure
Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
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Fig. 2. The construction.
Input A graph G,M players (si, ti) and a color set {1, . . . ,M}
Output A pure Nash equilibrium.
Find an (s1, t1) path and assign it color 1.
for i = 2, . . . ,M do
for χ = 1, . . . ,M do
Remove from G the edges belonging to paths colored χ .
Check if there exists a path between si and ti.
if YES then use it with color χ and break out of the for-loop over χ .
end
end
First notice that the above procedure will always assign a path and a color to every player (si, ti) since there are as many
colors as players and the graph is connected. Moreover, the resulting path coloring is a pure Nash equilibrium because no
player can defect: player (s1, t1) has the minimum cost (color 1) and every player (si, ti), i = 2, . . . ,M gets the minimum
possible color.
Since there is a P-time algorithm to compute an equilibrium it is natural to ask for a better one with respect to the total
number of colors used.
Proposition 2. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 2 (Color Number) is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is obviously in NP because we can count in polynomial time the total number of different colors used,
by examining all edges one by one. In order to prove completeness we reduce again k-Disjoint Paths to it.
Given an instance of k-Disjoint Paths, G, (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , k, we construct the following instance of Better Nash (G′,
(s′i, t
′
i ), i = 1, . . . , 2k) which resembles that used in the proof of Proposition 1 (See Fig. 3).
• In order to construct G′ we add in G for each (si, ti), the vertices ai, bi and the edges (si, ai), (ai, ti), (ti, bi) and (bi, si).
• The new players are (si, ti) and (ai, bi) for i = 1, . . . , k.
• The equilibrium point that completes the construction uses paths (si, ai, ti)with color 1 for the (si, ti) players and paths
(ai, si, bi)with color 2 for the (ai, bi) players.
The reasoning is analogous to that in Proposition 1. If there is a set of k disjoint paths in G then there is an equilibrium
point in which every player uses color 1. In this point players (si, ti) use this set of edge disjoint paths and players (ai, bi) use
the paths (ai, si, bi). Conversely, if there is a better Nash equilibrium then it uses only one color. So, every (si, ti) player uses
only edges ofG, because otherwise there is a conflict with (ai, bi) players and the number of colors needed is increased. Since
players (si, ti) can use the same color, the paths they use are edge disjoint. We also point out that the above construction
can be used to prove that the problem of finding the best Nash equilibrium (that is the one using the minimum number of
different colors) is NP-hard. 
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Fig. 3. The construction.
5. Cost function 3: Maximum congestion
The next cost function is related to the provided bandwidth:
gi((p1, χ1), . . . , (pM , χM)) =
{∞ if there is a conflict
max{w(e)|e ∈ pi} otherwise (4)
where w(e) is the congestion of e i.e., the number of paths that use edge e. That is, a player’s defect is now towards a path
with lightly used edges i.e., links where a smaller portion of their bandwidth is used. We point that in this case we only
measure the congestion on the edges of a path, so colors become actually irrelevant because a player can always switch to
a color that is not used by any of the other paths.
The existence of pure Nash equilibria is assured by the following theorem. Related versions of this theorem appear also
in ([5], Theorem 3) and ([6], Theorem 1).
Theorem 3. Pure Nash equilibria according to Cost Function 3 always exist.
Proof. Consider a feasible solution (valid coloring). Such a solution always exists (and can be found e.g. by the algorithm
of the previous subsection) and uses at most M colors if there are M players. We define the vector (potential) l =
(lM , lM−1, . . . , li)where li is the number of players with cost equal to i. We then examine every player’s strategies. If nobody
can defect we are at an equilibrium point. If there is a player of cost k that defects then we have the following. Elements
lM , lM−1, . . . , lk+1 continue having the same values. The player who defects cannot affect these players because in this case
his cost would be greater than k and so there would be no defect. lk is reduced by at least one as, at least the defecting player
(and maybe some more players with cost determined by him) moves to another, lower indexed li. Thus, the only elements
that can be increased are lk−1, lk−2, . . . , l1. So, a defection leads to a lexicographically better l, thus at the end we will reach
an equilibrium under Cost Function 3. 
Theorem 4. The question if a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium can be answered in P-time.
Proof. The proof is based on the following lemma whose proof can be found e.g. in [8].
Lemma 1. In aweighted graph G the (s, t)-path implied by aminimum spanning tree is amin-maxweighted path, i.e. aminimum
weight path where we charge a path by the weight of its heaviest edge. Equivalently, each edge e of a minimum spanning tree T
of a weighted graph G has the minimum weight among all edges in the cut of G defined by the removal of e from T .
Consider a feasible solution in which the kth player (sk, tk) uses path pk and color χk. To check if the solution is an
equilibrium we examine if there exists a player who can defect, i.e. a player who can use a different path-color pair with
cost less than the current’s. To this end, we examine every player and every color χ in turn by first removing every edge
of the graph used by a χ-colored path and assigning to each remaining edge the following weight. In the case where χ is
the current color of the kth player, we do not remove edges of the current path because the player may use them again. The
weight is defined by
w(e) =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
i=1,...,M,i6=k
{χi : e ∈ pi}
∣∣∣∣∣+ 1, (5)
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where σi = (pi, χi) is the strategy (path-color pair) used by player i. That is, edge e has weight equal to the number of paths
using it, increased by 1 to reflect the potential use of e by player k. We then find a minimum spanning tree in the remaining
graph with edge weights defined by (5). The proposed new (sk, tk) path p is the one implied by the minimum spanning
tree. By its construction p does not conflict with any other χ-colored path and by Lemma 1 its cost under cost function 3,
maxe∈pw(e), is minimum. If this cost is less than the current cost of player k then player k is better off defecting to this new
strategy (p, χ). Conversely, if all colors are examined as above and no better strategy is discovered, then no better strategy
exists. 
Unfortunately, in revision of a previous version of this paper [15], the existence of a polynomial algorithm for computing
a Nash equilibrium point under Cost Function 3, is still open. The analysis in Theorem 3 of the above reference contains an
error in the estimation of the total time. However, this analysis is applicable in computing an equilibrium of an interesting
broadcast variant of the problem which we present after the next section.
Returning to Cost Function 3, the problem of finding an equilibrium with fewer colors, is again NP-complete.
Proposition 3. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 3 (Maximum Congestion) is NP-complete.
Proof. See Proposition 1. The main observation is that the proposed equilibria with respect to Cost Function 1, are also
equilibria with respect to Cost Function 3. 
6. Cost function 4: Maximum chromatic level
The last cost function is related to the bandwidth too, but from another viewpoint:
gi((p1, χ1), . . . , (pM , χM)) =
{∞ if there is a conflict
max{W (e)|e ∈ pi} otherwise (6)
whereW (e) is the maximum color number (chromatic level) that appears on edge e. That is, now an edge is charged by the
highest frequency used on it. Notice that an edge may get greater weight, though it is used by only a few paths.
Proposition 4. Pure Nash equilibria under Cost Function 4 always exist.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 3. 
Furthermore, we have
Proposition 5. The question if a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium can be answered in polynomial time.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 4 except that the weight assigned to each edge when we consider M players with strategies
(pi, χi), i = 1 . . .M and examine color χ for player k is
w(e) = max
{
{χ} ∪
⋃
i=1,...,M,i6=k
{χi : e ∈ pi}
}
. (7)
In this way the cost of an (s, t)-path p equalsmaxe∈pw(e). This cost getsminimized by the (s, t)-path implied by aminimum
spanning tree, according to Lemma 1. 
Finally, the problem Better Nash is again NP-complete.
Proposition 6. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 4 (Maximum Chromatic Level) is NP-complete.
Proof. See Proposition 1. Again, the proposed 2-color equilibrium is also an equilibrium for both cost functions 1 and 4. 
7. Maximum congestion: The broadcast case
As promised in Section 5, we study here an interesting variant of the problemwhere a set of transmitting nodes broadcast
a message to every other node in the network, each node using a single channel (color) for its broadcast. Once more, if two
nodes use the same edge for their transmission, they must use different colors. Notice that in this case a node transmits
via a spanning tree of the graph, since any cycle in the transmission route introduces redundancy. In the game-theoretic
approach therefore, a player’s strategy consists of a spanning tree denoting the links to be used and a color denoting the
wavelength to be used.
Wemention that a similar problem is studied in [1], except that the cost function is the sum of the congestion values, not
the maximum congestion. In that setting, the problem of ‘‘minimum congestion spanning trees’’ is modeled as a matroid
congestion game.
The problem is defined as follows:
• Players: M players (notice that a player’s broadcasting node si, i = 1, . . . ,M is not important as every node must be
included in a spanning tree).
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• Strategies: Pairs σi = (Ti, χi)where Ti is a spanning tree of the graph and χi is a color (wavelength). We represent colors
as integers in the interval [1..c].
• Cost: For each player i = 1, . . . ,M a cost function gi(σ1, . . . , σM).
The specific cost function we examine is related to Cost Function 3:
gi((T1, χ1), . . . , (TM , χM)) =
{∞ if there is a conflict
max{w(e)|e ∈ Ti} otherwise (8)
where w(e) is the broadcast congestion of e i.e., the number of different players, i.e. trees (not different paths as with cost
function 3) that use edge e. A Nash equilibrium under this setting is a set of spanning trees (strategies) such that no spanning
tree can be replaced by another whose maximum congestion edge has less weight.
Notice that what we really seek in the above problem is M spanning trees. The assignment of colors to the trees can be
done in a straightforwardway by an algorithm analogous to that of Section 4with the only restriction that two trees sharing
an edge must be assigned different colors.
Subsequently we shall show that under this cost function a Nash equilibrium point can be computed in polynomial time,
by the following algorithm.
Algorithm COMPUTE-NASH(G)
Input G = (V , E),M players.
Output Nash equilibrium.
for every e ∈ E dow(e) = 0;
for k = 1 toM do
Tk = ({sk},∅);
for j = 1 to |V | − 1 do
{comment:Cis the set of edges that cross the current cutVTk , V − VTk};
Let γ be the edge in C with minimumw;
w(γ ) = w(γ )+ 1;
Update Tk by adding edge γ to it;
VALIDATE(γ );
endfor
endfor
Algorithm COMPUTE-NASH inserts one by one the players (k-loop, see above). For each newly inserted player it tries to
build a minimum spanning tree Tk = (VTk , ETk) using a variant of Prim’s algorithm (where by VTk (resp. ETk ) we denote the
set of nodes (resp. edges) already included in the tree Tk). In each step of this process (j-loop) the minimum weight edge γ
among those having one endpoint in VTk and the other in V − VTk is selected (as done in Prim’s algorithm) and the tree is
updated with γ . At each step the number of trees containing e is denoted byw(e). The weight of γ is then increased by one
to reflect that it has now been included in the tree under construction. Then function VALIDATE is called for γ .
Function VALIDATE(γ )
i= DEFECT(γ );
if i 6= 0 then do
w(γ ) = w(γ )− 1;
γ ′ = min(Ci(γ )); (see function DEFECT)
ETi = ETi − {γ } ∪ {γ ′};
w(γ ′) = w(γ ′)+ 1;
VALIDATE(γ ′);
endif
VALIDATE examines the effect of increasing the weight of γ on the already built trees (those corresponding to players
1 . . . k− 1) and the current tree Tk, by discovering players who can defect (function DEFECT) and updating their trees.
Function DEFECT(γ )
Input Edge γ .
Output A player iwith γ ∈ ETi and who can do better by not using γ .
{comment: Ci(e) is the set of edges of G that cross the cut of Ti which results
if we remove e from Ti; min(Ci(e)) is the edge with minimumw in Ci(e); }
Find i ≤ k for which γ ∈ Ti andw(min(Ci(γ ))) < w(γ )− 1;
if not found then set i = 0;
return i;
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By ‘‘cut’’ of a tree wemean the partition of its nodes into two sets that result if we remove an edge e of the tree. Therefore
Ci(e) is the set of edges of G that have their endpoints belonging to different sets of the cut. Notice that this definition also
applies even if i = k, i.e. for the partially constructed tree Tk. In this case, the two sets of a cut contain only the nodes of the
partially constructed tree Tk.
We now have the following:
Theorem 5. Algorithm COMPUTE-NASH correctly computes in polynomial time, a pure Nash equilibrium of the maximum
congestion in the broadcast case.
Proof. The proof of correctness is based on Lemma 1. The basic idea is that of a valid edge: a tree edge e is valid if for every
i = 1, . . . , k such that e ∈ Ti, w(e) ≤ w (min(Ci(e))) + 1, where min(Ci(e)) is the minimum cost edge between those
in Ci(e). In other words e is valid if its weight is at most one greater than any other edge in the cut. The validity condition
captures the fact that when a player chooses to use an edge e,w(e) is increased by one to reflect that one more path passes
through e. This is the reasonwe usew(e) ≤ w (min(Ci(e)))+1 rather thanw(e) ≤ w (min(Ci(e))), as the validity condition.
We also point that, according to the definition of Ci(e), the validity condition can be applied to edges belonging to already
computed trees Ti, as well as the tree Tk that is currently being built.
The proof now rests on the following claim:
Claim. Assume we have constructed k spanning trees. If every edge of these trees is valid, we have reached an equilibrium.
Proof of the claim. Assume that every edge is valid but one of the spanning trees, say Tl can be replaced by another tree
T whose heaviest edge is strictly lighter than the heaviest edge of Tl (after replacing Tl). Let us introduce subscripts ‘‘B’’,
and ‘‘A’’ to denote the weights of an edge before and after the replacement. Consider the heaviest edge e of Tl and the
corresponding cut Cl(e). If we replace Tl by T at least one of the edges, say e′, of T crosses Cl(e). Since T is a defect for player
l, then wA(e′) < wB(e). But wA(e′) = wB(e′)+ 1, hence wB(e′)+ 1 < wB(e) which contradicts the validity assumption for
e in the cut Cl(e). 
The correctness follows from the following condition which is maintained throughout the j-loop:
Every edge in every tree Ti, i = 1, . . . , k is valid, except (maybe) edge γ that is, the current parameter of function
VALIDATE. Moreover, when an iteration of the j-loop is concluded (in other words when one more vertex has been added
to the spanning tree under construction) every edge in every tree, including the partially constructed tree Tk, is valid.
Consider the situation where we start a new j iteration and assume inductively that every edge of every tree is valid. The
jth iteration selects the minimum weight edge γ to augment the tree Tk and consequently increases its weight, w(γ ), by
1. Edge γ may now become invalid for another tree Ti (possibly more than one) because of some other edge in its cut, say
edge γ ′, such that γ ′ = min(Ci(γ )) and for which the validity inequality is violated, i.e.w(γ ′) < w(γ )− 1. Edge γ cannot
be invalid however for Tk as all edges in the newly created cut of Tk have weight at least w(γ )− 1 by the Prim’s algorithm
criterion of inserting one new edge.
The non-validity of γ for Ti results in a sequence of calls to VALIDATE to restore its validity. Each call to VALIDATE restores
the validity of γ but possibly spoils the validity of a single edge γ ′. Notice that when we restore the validity of γ for some
tree Ti we also restore its validity for every tree since this is done by removing γ from Ti and thus restoring its weight to its
previous value (one less). Notice also that in the sequence of calls to VALIDATE, every new call has as parameter an edgewith
weight one less than the previous call because of the validity condition. Therefore, at mostM calls to VALIDATE are required
after the insertion of a new edge in Tk. After the termination of this sequence all edges of all trees are again valid and Tk has
been augmented by one more edge (and vertex). Notice also, that if an edge e of the current tree Tk is found invalid at some
point in the sequence of calls of VALIDATE, it can only be replaced by some other edge in Ck(e) since any other edge crossing
VTk , V − VTk can have weight at least w(e) + 1 by the way the Prim’s algorithm constructs a spanning tree. Therefore, tree
Tk remains connected.
Regarding the complexity of the algorithm we have that an insertion of an edge results in at mostM calls to VALIDATE.
Each of these calls needs at most O(M|E|) time due to the call to DEFECT (we check at most M trees and in each we try to
compute the cheapest edge crossing a cut). Finally, we construct M trees, thus the time needed is O(M3|V ||E|) where |V |
and |E| are the number of nodes and the number of edges in G respectively. 
8. Conclusions and future work
We have examined the behavior of WDM all-optical networks under a game-theoretic approach and under several cost
functions. Our results (summarized in Table 1) show that the complexity of the problems of recognition and computation
of pure Nash equilibria varies from polynomial to NP-complete.
As complexity theory and game theory are converging, many more may be done for analyzing network problems. Some
suggestions along the lines of this work follow: First, we may analyze WDM routing under the cost-functions 3,4 regarding
the complexity of computing an equilibrium. Second, we may try to analyze along the same directions the multicast
congestion (MC) problem [28]: we are given a network, that is an undirected graph G = (V , E) and a set of subsets of
Sj of V (called terminals). We are asked to find a set Tj of trees in E each spanning the respective set Sj. Let the congestion
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Table 1
Our results regarding pure Nash equilibria in all-optical networks.
Function Existence Nash Recognition Computing Better Nash
Number of color conflicts Always NP-complete Open NP-complete
Frequency (color number) Always PTIME PTIME NP-complete
Max congestion (paths) Always PTIME Open NP-complete
Max frequency Always PTIME Open NP-complete
Max congestion-broadcast Always PTIME PTIME Open
of an edge e be the number of Tj trees that contain e. How can we keep the congestion low? E.g. one may ask to keep the
maximum congestion at a minimum level. Again we may try to analyze this problem by defining various analogous cost
functions and considering each set of terminals as a player of a suitable non-cooperative game.
Furthermore, the problem of a cooperative game formulation may be analyzed in order to limit the overall cost of an
equilibrium, that is the total amount of bandwidth needed.
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